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I.

INTRODUCTION

Following the implosion of Enron, WorldCom, and other corporate
2
behemoths due to corporate malfeasance, policy-makers,' academics,

1. See Demetri Sevastopulo, Enron Task Force Slowly Closes in on Higher Level Targets:
InvestigationHas Its Criticsbut GradualProgress is Being Made, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2002, at 2.

2. See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak, CorporateFraud:See, Lawyers, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
195 (2003); Andrew F. Kirkendall, Filling in the GAAP: Will the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Protect
Investors from CorporateMalfeasance and Restore Confidence in the Securities Market?, 56 SMU
L. REv. 2303 (2003); Andre Douglas Pond Cumming, The Integration Conundrum: Debilitating
Failures of the Securities and Exchange Commission Must Be Addressed as U.S. Corporate
Malfeasance is "Getting Serious, So Serious, " 48 WAYNE L. REv. 1305 (2003); Larry E. Ribstein,
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and regulatory bodies 3 sought to reassess securities industry practices
and regulations. First, it was the accountants. As a result of Arthur
Andersen's role in the malfeasance, the big five accounting firms
dwindled down to the final four.4 Given that the frauds perpetuated by
these entities centered on shoddy accounting practices and rosy balance
sheets, Congress boldly substituted the self-regulatory scheme that
traditionally governed accountants with the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board.5
Congress did not stop with accountants. Attorneys also played a
role in the malfeasance, so they too were targeted.6 Congress, via
congressional mandate in Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, 7 instructed the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") to
"issue rules, in the public interest and for the protection of investors,
setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys
Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, 28 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1 (2002).
3. For recent discussion on the initiatives of regulatory bodies see generally, Karen
Contoudis, Note, Analyst Conflicts Of Interests. Are The NASD and NYSE Rules Enough?, 8
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 123 (2003); Karessa Cain, New Efforts To Strengthen Corporate
Governance: Why Use SRO Listing Standards?, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 619; Jillian M.
Lutzy, Analysis of the Proposed NYSE Corporate Governance and Audit Committee Listing
Requirements, 2 DEPAUL Bus. & COMM. L.J. 99 (2003).
4. See Stephen C. Gara and Craig J. Langstraat, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A New
Ballgame for Accountants, 34 U. MEM. L. REV. 73, 112 (2003). For a discussion on the jury
conviction of Arthur Andersen on obstruction of justice charges, see generally, Stephan Landsman,
The Jury In Practice:Death OfAn Accountant: The Jury Convicts Arthur Andersen Of Obstruction
Of Justice, 78 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1203 (2003) (arguing that the Andersen verdict may be a
watershed in American legal thinking about the misconduct of large corporations and their
advisors).
5. See Judith Bums, Attorneys Face a Paradox in the SEC's Conduct Rules, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 19, 2003, atCl.
6. Specifically, the Houston based law firm of Vinson & Elkins, who represented Enron in
certain off-shore transactions, was targeted. See Carrie Johnson, House Panel To Question Enron 's
Attorneys, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2002, at El. Corporate attorneys have been suspected of
furthering the fraud of their clients since the Securities and Exchange Commission's inception. As
Former SEC commissioner and Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas artfully noted:
[J]ust as a fine, natural football player needs coaching in the fundamentals and schooling
in the wiles of the sport, so, too, it takes a corporation lawyer with a heart for the game
to organize a great stock swindle or income tax dodge and drill the financiers in all the
precise details of their play. Otherwise, in their natural enthusiasm to rush in and grab
everything that happens not to be nailed down and guarded with shotguns they would
soon be caught offside and penalized, and some of the noted financiers who are now
immortalized as all-time and all-American larcenists never would have risen beyond the
level of the petty thief or short-change man.
William 0. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1305, 1329 (1934) (quoting
Westbrook Pegler, N.Y. WORLD TELEGRAM, Jan. 24, 1923, at 19).
7. Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) [hereinafter "Sarbanes-Oxley"].
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appearing and practicing before the Commission in any way in the
representation of issuers."8
This Note will explore the SEC's attempt to regulate the conduct of
attorneys practicing before it, which until now has been a right that the
states, for the most part, have assumed. 9 Recently enacted SEC rules
require attorneys to report "evidence" of wrongdoing up the corporate
chain of command to corporate directors and officers.1 0 One part of the
SEC's proposed rule-making that is still pending adoption even requires
1 the so-called "noisy
attorneys to report misconduct to the SEC itself,"
2
withdrawal" or "reporting out" requirement.' The American Bar
Association ("ABA") and other critics of the proposed new law,
however, believe that the SEC has invaded their authority by exploiting
3 This debate is still open
the recent congressional delegation of power.1
4
unresolved.'
remain
issues
and several legal
The scope of this debate is wide-ranging and could potentially
affect the way in which attorney conduct is governed in the future. When
the SEC initially proposed its professional conduct rules under Section
307, many law firms, academics, and regulators expressed important
concerns regarding the scope and consequences of such a rule. Over 167
comments were received and published on the SEC's website, many of
which were concerned with the SEC's regulation of attorney conduct
and preemption of state ethics rules.15
For instance, in a comment to the SEC, the New York State Bar
Association wrote with respect to the preemption issue: "[d]espite the
indisputable importance of this question, the SEC scarcely addresses the
question. In the 73-page adopting release, the SEC never confronts the
question head-on ... [t]he SEC simply 'reaffirms that its rules shall
6 Another
prevail over any conflicting or inconsistent laws of a state."",1
commentator suggested that "the Commission must address the issue of
8. See id.
9. See infra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
10. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. 629601 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205) [hereinafter "Final Rule"].
11. See id.
12.

See Gary Young, Corporate-FraudStatute: A New Source of Lawyer Regulation, NAT'L

L.J., Aug. 5, 2002, at A 19. This Note will use these terms interchangeably.
13. See id.
14.

See Susan P. Koniak, When The Hurlyburly's Done: The Bar's Struggle With The SEC,

103 COLUM. L. REV. 1236, 1237 (2003) ("This saga is not yet over; that much is true.").
15. See Final Rule, supra note 10.
16. Comment of The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, April 7, 2003, at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502.shtml (last visited Nov. 20, 2003).
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whether7 the Proposed Rules could or should preempt state ethics
'1
rules."
The purpose of this Note is to discuss the powers and authority of
both governmental entities, and analyze both the states' and the SEC's
position with respect to the preemption issue. Central to this debate is
the organized bar associations' opposition to reporting requirements in
the newly enacted corporate-fraud statute, which will be discussed below
in greater detail. 18 Several bar associations have been critical of the
SEC's proposals.' 9 This is due in large part to the potential conflicts with
state legal ethics rules that may arise as a result of the SEC's reporting
requirements. In response to state bar criticisms, the SEC has taken a
firm position regarding their authority to preempt contrary state ethics
rules.2' While the debate remains unresolved, it may have broader
ramifications in future administrative agency rule-making efforts.
Part II generally discusses the SEC's authority to regulate the
securities markets, 22 and then focuses on the relevant congressional
delegation of authority and the SEC's rulemaking authority.23
Additionally, the SEC's attempts to regulate professionals that practice
before it, such as attorneys and public accountants, are explored. The
SEC's prior attempts, beginning in the 1970s and continuing as a result
of recent corporate malfeasance, are discussed. 4 It becomes clear that
the SEC's desire to regulate attorney conduct has been long-standing and
persistently on the Commission's agenda. This provides the proper
context to discuss the SEC's recent efforts.
Part III discusses the attorney confidentiality rules that are the
subject of the SEC's action. 25 The Sarbanes-Oxley congressional
17. Comment of Nancy B. Rappaport, Dean and Professor of Law, University of Houston
Law Center, December 18, 2002, at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/nbrapoportl.htm
(last visited Nov. 20, 2003).
18.
19.

See infra notes 169-193 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Sue Reisinger, Two State Bars Protest SEC Rule; Calif., Wash. Dislike

'ReportingOut', NAT'L L.J., Sept. 15, 2003, at 1.
20. See id. See also Sue Reisinger, Californiaand Washington State Bars Protest SEC Rule,
RECORDER, Sept. 23, 2003, at 9.

21. See infra notes 187-229 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 7.
24. For a discussion on these early SEC attempts see Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff,
SEC Adopts ProfessionalConduct Standardsfor Attorneys, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 24, 2003 (citing Edward
F. Greene, Lawyer Disciplinary Proceedings before the Securities and Exchange Commission,
Remarks to the New York County Lawyers' Association (Jan. 18, 1982), Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
83,089).
25. See infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
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delegation of power and the rules the SEC subsequently adopted
pursuant to the delegation are explored.26 Further, the details of the
legislative mandate and the procedures attorneys are now required to
pursue when confronted with corporate malfeasance are illustrated.
Part IV analyzes the federal preemption doctrine.27 This includes a
discussion of the Constitution's Supremacy Clause,2 8 and the differences
between explicit and implicit preemption. The Supreme Court cases
discussing preemption will be analyzed to formulate a step-by-step
preemption analysis. This Part then discusses the legal opinions issued
by the Washington Bar Association ("Washington Opinion") 29 and the
Corporations Committee of the California State Bar ("Corporations
Committee"). 30 These two powerful expressions of state authority are
important to understanding the states' position in the debate.
Part V analyzes the conflict between SEC and state rules in light of
Supreme Court precedent. This Part reduces the Supreme Court's
preemption jurisprudence to several principles and applies these
principles to the conflict at hand. In applying these principles, and
assessing the legislative history of Sarbanes-Oxley relating to the
congressional delegation to the SEC in Section 307, it becomes apparent
that a court will likely hold that the SEC's permissive reporting out rule
preempts contrary state ethics rules. Part VI ultimately concludes that
the positions articulated by the Washington and California Bar
Associations are contrary to undisputed principles traditionally and
consistently applied by the Supreme Court in its long-standing
preemption jurisprudence.

26. See Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 7.
27. See infra notes 130-132 and accompanying text.
28. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause states, "[t]his Constitution, and the
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law
of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
29. See Interim Formal Ethics Opinion Re: The Effect of the SEC's Sarbanes-Oxley
Regulations On Washington Attorneys' Obligations Under the RPCs (As approved and adopted by
WSBA Board of Governors on July 26, 2003), at http://www.wsba.org/lawyers/
groups/ethics2003/formalopinion.doc (last visited Feb. 12, 2004) [hereinafter Washington Bar
Opinion].
30. See Letter from the Corporations Committee of the Business Law section of the State Bar
of California to Giovanni P. Prezioso, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Aug. 13, 2003),
at http://dwalliance.com/sbar/SEC.PDF (last visited Feb. 12, 2004) (regarding the effect of the
SEC's Attorney Conduct Rules) [hereinafter "California Letter"].
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BACKGROUND ON SEC AUTHORITY

Pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange
Act"), 31 Congress created the SEC to oversee and regulate the securities
markets.32 Congress also empowered the SEC to enforce the provisions
of the Exchange Act. Most importantly, and of relevance to this Note,
Congress granted the SEC rule-making authority. 33 Section 23(b) of the
Exchange Act grants broad authority to the SEC to adopt rules and
regulations "as may be necessary or appropriate," to implement the
Exchange Act. 34 Congress conferred this broad authority to adopt rules

that further the public interest.
A.

The SEC's Rule-Making Authority

Section 23(a) of the Exchange Act grants broad rule-making
authority to the SEC and provides the Agency with the
power to make such rules and regulations as may be necessary or
appropriate to implement the provisions of this title for which they are
responsible or for the execution of the functions vested in them ... and
may for such purposes classify persons, securities, transactions,
statements, applications, reports and other matters within their
greater, lesser, or different
respective jurisdictions and prescribe 35
requirements for different classes thereof.
This rule-making authority has been questioned, challenged, affirmed
and struck down. 36 Nevertheless, this delegation of rule-making power
has served as the SEC's source of authority 7
Case law has impeded the SEC's ability to promulgate rules
concerning securities fraud and the regulation of accountants.38 The
courts have generally recognized that it is appropriate for the SEC to
31. 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (2004).
32. See SEC, The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors and Maintains
Market Integrity (modified July 21, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml.
33. See 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a).
34. See id.
35. Id.
36. For more on this controversial area see supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text, and
infra notes 37-48 and accompanying text.
37. For a discussion on the SEC's rule-making authority, see generally Ely R. Levy, The Law
and Economics of IPO Favoritism andRegulatory Spin, 33 Sw. U.L. REV. 185,209-10 (2004).
38. See, e.g., U. S. v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 557 (2d Cir. 1991) (restricting the SEC's
rulemaking authority with respect to insider trading rules). See also Davey v. SEC, 792 F.2d 1418,
1422 (9th Cir. 1986) (granting agencies the power to police the conduct of those who practice
before them or participate in their programs).
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protect the integrity of its processes, and to encourage professionals to
maintain minimum standards of competence. 39 There have been
instances, however, where the SEC's authority in this respect has been
questioned and challenged.
For instance, in Davy v. SEC40 the SEC found that a certified public
accountant had engaged in improper professional conduct and had
willfully violated the federal securities laws by certifying inaccurate
42
financial statements. 41 Davy, the accountant, argued that Rule 2(e)
under which his actions were banned, was beyond the SEC's statutory
authority.4 3 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the SEC did in
fact have authority to police the conduct of those who practice before it
or participate in their programs. 44 The court found that the SEC's rulemaking is a necessary adjunct to the Commission's power to protect the
integrity of its administrative procedures and the public in general.4 5
A similar challenge occurred in United States v. Chestman.46 In
Chestman, the defendant bought shares of a company after he received
information from a client that the company was about to be sold.47 The
defendant claimed that Rule 14e-3(a), a rule prohibiting trading based on
insider knowledge of a tender offer, was invalid because the SEC had
exceeded its statutory authority by promulgating a rule that dispensed
with one of the common law elements of fraud.48 The district court
rejected the argument, however, and the defendant was convicted of
insider trading in violation of several SEC anti-fraud rules including
Rule 14e-3(a), 49 Rule lOb-5, 50 and 18 U.S.C. § 1341. 51 On appeal, the
Second Circuit held that the SEC had been given broad authority to

39. See Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that Rule 2(e) was
validly promulgated pursuant to the Commission's "broad authority" to adopt rules and regulations
necessary to carry out the Commission's designated functions).
40. 792 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1986).
41. Seeid. at 1419.
42. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2 (2004).
43. See Davey, 792 F.2d at 1419.
44. See id. at 1422.
45. Id. at 1421-22.
46. 947 F.2d 551 (2d. Cir. 1991).
47. See id.
48. Seeid. at 556.
49. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (2004).
50. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2004).
51. See Chestman, 947 F.2d at 554.
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promulgate rules that would prohibit tender offer insider trading, and
had not exceeded its authority in promulgating Rule 14e-3(a). 2
These challenges notwithstanding, the general rule-making
authority pursuant to Section 23 has been relatively unfettered. The SEC
has used this delegation as its primary mechanism in promulgating rules
and policies. 3 The SEC's rulemaking in the specific context of
professional conduct has been, and still is, more controversial.
B. Regulating ProfessionalConduct.: Past and Present
The SEC has its own rule governing the conduct of professionals
that practice before it: Rule 102(e), formerly Rule 2(e), of the
Commission's Rules of Practice. 4 The authority of the SEC to
promulgate and enforce this rule has been consistently upheld pursuant
to its "broad authority" to adopt rules and regulations necessary to carry
out the Commission's functions.5 5 This rule functions as a "means to
ensure that those professionals, on whom the Commission relies heavily
in the performance of its statutory duties, perform their tasks diligently
and with a reasonable degree of competence. 6 Rule 102(e) does not
establish professional standards, yet it enables the SEC to discipline
professionals engaging in improper conduct by failing to satisfy rules,
regulations, or standards to which they are already subject.57 This rule
52. See id. at 570. The defendant, however, could not be convicted for Rule lOb-5 or 18
U.S.C. § 1341 violations since he owed no fiduciary duty to the company nor did his client. As a
result, the court affirmed defendant's conviction under Rule 14e-3(a), but reversed his convictions
for Rule lOb-5 and 18 U.S.C. § 1341 violations.
53. See Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979).
54. 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (2004). Rule 2(e), the predecessor to Rule 102(e), was
promulgated in 1935. Rule 2(e) was redesignated Rule 102(e) in 1995. This rule will be referred to
throughout this Note as Rule 102(e).
55. See Touche Ross & Co., 609 F.2d at 570; Davy, 792 F.2d at 1418 (holding that the SEC
had statutory authority to adopt Rule 102(e)); Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(stating that "[t]here can be little doubt that the Commission, like any other institution in which
lawyers or other professionals participate, has authority to police the behavior of practitioners
before it") (Silberman, J., quoting Polydoroffv. ICC, 773 F.2d 372, 374 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
56. Touche Ross & Co., 609 F.2d at 582.
57. 17 CFR 201.102(e)(2) and (0(2). The statute reads, in relevant part, as follows:
(e) Suspension and disbarment. (1) Generally. The Commission may censure a person or
deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of appearing or practicing before it in
any way to any person who is found by the Commission after notice and opportunity for
hearing in the matter:
(i) Not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others; or
(ii) To be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged in unethical or improper
professional conduct; or
(iii) To have willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the violation of any
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has traditionally allowed the SEC to initiate disciplinary proceedings
against attorneys who violate federal securities law. The rule also allows
the SEC to use appropriate 5sanctions
including censure, temporary
8
suspension, and permanent bar.
In the late 1970s, the SEC was confronted with issues relating to
the responsibilities of attorneys to report misconduct of their public
company clients. In In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp, 59 the
Commission instituted and settled a Rule 102(e) proceeding against a
law firm which had prepared SEC filings for a financial client. 60 The
SEC concluded that virtually every practicing member of the law firm
was privy to the fact that disclosures contained in the client's disclosure
filings were fraudulent and misleading. 6 1 Furthermore, the attorneys
knew or had reason to know that the internal procedures at the firm were
inadequate to ensure that this information was properly evaluated in
connection with the firm's preparation of SEC filings.62 The
Commission specifically noted that law firms have a duty "to make sure
that disclosure documents filed with the Commission include all material
facts about a client of which it has knowledge as a result of its legal
representation of that client., 63 This case planted the seed for the SEC's
first genuine attempt to regulate attorney conduct.
provision of the Federal securities laws or the rules and regulations thereunder.
(iv) With respect to persons licensed to practice as accountants, "improper professional
conduct" under § 201.102(e)(1)(ii) means:
(A) Intentional or knowing conduct, including reckless conduct, that results in a
violation of applicable professional standards; or (B) Either of the following two types of
negligent conduct:
(1) A single instance of highly unreasonable conduct that results in a violation of
applicable professional standards in circumstances in which an accountant knows, or
should know, that heightened scrutiny is warranted.
(2) Repeated instances of unreasonable conduct, each resulting in a violation of
applicable professional standards, that indicate a lack of competence to practice before
the Commission....
(3) Temporary suspensions. An order of temporary suspension shall become effective
upon service on the respondent. No order of temporary suspension shall be entered by
the Commission pursuant to paragraph (e)(3)(i) of this section more than 90 days after
the date on which the final judgment or order entered in a judicial or administrative
proceeding described in paragraph (e)(3)(i)(A) or (e)(3)(i)(B) of this section has become
effective, whether upon completion of review or appeal procedures or because further
review or appeal procedures are no longer available.
58. 17 C.F.R. 201.102(e)(2) and (0(2).
59. 47 S.E.C. 95 (July 2, 1979).
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. Id.
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Following the line of argumentation in Keating, the SEC again
pursued attorney misconduct. In SEC v. National Student Marketing
Corp.,64 National Student Marketing Corporation consummated a merger
with Interstate National Corporation, an insurance company.6 5 Shortly
after the merger was completed the value of the publicly traded stock
dramatically decreased.6 6 The attorneys, who negotiated and issued
opinions in approval of the merger, were targeted.67 The SEC brought an
enforcement action arguing that
the attorneys should have refused to issue the opinions in view of the
adjustments revealed by the unsigned comfort letter, and after receipt
of the signed version, they should have withdrawn their opinion with
regard to the merger and demanded resolicitation of the Interstate
shareholders. 6 8
Essentially, the SEC's enforcement effort centered on the fact that the
attorneys failed to take action against the fraud and issued an opinion
that was not withdrawn after fraud was apparent. 69 The court, however,
rejected the SEC's arguments and found that the activities of the lawyers
did not facilitate the merger.7 0 The court ultimately refused to impose
liability on the attorneys. 7'
In In re Carter & Johnson,72 two attorneys failed to correct
company press releases and earnings reports that were later determined
to be misleading. An SEC administrative law judge found the attorneys
liable for aiding and abetting their clients under the federal securities
laws. On appeal, the SEC reversed the judge's decision because the
appeals court held that Rule 102(e) did not clearly proscribe the conduct
of the attorneys.7 3 Consequently, the attorneys were let off without
sanction.
Going forward, however, the SEC warned that it would expand the
scope of Rule 102(e) to cover such situations. Specifically, in future
instances, the rule would be interpreted as follows:

64.

457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).

65. See id. at 687.
66. See id. at 700.
67. See id. at 699.
68. Id. at 700-01.
69.

Seeid. at712.

70. Seeid. at713.
71.
72.

See id.
47 S.E.C. 471 (Feb. 1981).

73. See id. at *29-*31.
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When a lawyer with significant responsibilities in the effectuation of a
company's compliance with the disclosure requirements of the federal
securities laws becomes aware that his client is engaged in a
substantial and continuing failure to satisfy those disclosure
requirements, his continued participation violates professional
standards unless
74 he takes prompt steps to end the client's
noncompliance.
With respect to attorney regulation, the administrative law judge
indicated that the attorney can "counsel accurate disclosure" by the
client. If the attorney learns of a discrepancy, the attorney is then
required to take "more affirmative steps," including possibly a "direct
approach to the board of directors or one or more individual directors or
officers" or an attempt "to enlist the aid of other members of the firm's
management" to correct the deficiency.75
Central to the Carter & Johnson decision was the Commission's
solicitation of comments from the public regarding whether the scope of
Rule 102 should modified.76 Specifically, the SEC sought to expand the
definition of "unethical or improper professional conduct" in Rule
77
102(e) and impose the aforementioned responsibilities on attorneys.
The very prospect of tinkering with standards regulating attorney
conduct attracted harsh criticism and strong opposition from bar
associations. The SEC's initiative to broaden the scope-of Rule 102(e) as
a means to regulate attorney conduct later failed. This was only the
beginning of the festering debate.
Following this episode, the SEC's then general counsel, Edward
Greene, criticized the effort to regulate attorneys.7 8 In a speech by
Greene to the New York County Lawyers' Association, he stated that the
SEC lacks the time and expertise to promulgate a code for professionals,
specifically attorneys who practice before it.79 Furthermore, Greene
suggested that the SEC focus its attention on bringing Rule 102(e)

74.

See id. at *30.

75.

ld.at "31.

76.
77.

Id. at *28.
See Request for Comments on Standard of Conduct Constituting Unethical or Improper

Professional Practice Before the Commission, Exchange Act Release No. 18100, 1981 SEC LEXIS
730 at *2 (Sept. 21, 1981).

78.

See Block & Hoff, supra note 24 (citing Edward F. Greene, Lawyer Disciplinary

Proceedings before the Securities and Exchange Commission, Remarks to the New York County
Lawyers' Association, (Jan. 18, 1982), Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,089).
79. See SEC Official's Speech Urging Narrow2 (e) Approach, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 25, 1982 at
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proceedings against attorneys when the misconduct represents "a
violation of established state law ethical or professional misconduct
80
rules and has a direct impact on the Commission's internal processes.,
Along these lines, Greene stated:
When the attorney's alleged misconduct is predicated on theories of
aiding and abetting liability, as it almost always is when the conduct
involves the preparation and filing of documents, and the Commission
is also proceeding against the principals in a simultaneous injunctive
action, I believe that the wisest course for the Commission to follow is
to add the attorney to the injunctive action as a co-defendant. If that is
not possible for unusual reasons, then an administrative proceeding
under Rule [102(e)] could be commenced. And in those administrative
proceedings based upon violations of standards of ethical or
that the Commission should use
professional conduct, I believe
81
existing state law standards.
This strict adherence to the state law ethics paradigm was the general
position embraced by state bar associations, commentators, and
practitioners. From the private bar's perspective, the SEC should never
regulate or discipline attorney conduct absent a clear judicial
determination that the lawyer has violated federal securities laws.
The SEC nevertheless refused to give up. In 1988, the SEC issued a
release announcing adoption of an amendment to Rule 102(e) to provide
for public proceedings initiated under the rule. 2 The SEC's main focus
in this release was to conduct its Rule 102 proceedings in public.8 3 The
release contained a lengthy discussion supporting the SEC's conclusion
that the benefit of conducting such proceedings in public outweighed the
competing privacy concerns.8 4 The SEC noted that it "has generally
utilized Rule proceedings against attorneys only where the attorney's
conduct has already provided the basis for a judicial or administrative
order finding a securities law violation in a non-rule [102(e)]
proceeding" thus adhering to Greene's advice and the bar associations'
position articulated earlier. 85 This model of regulation was later altered

80.
81.

See id.
See id.

82. See Disciplinary Proceedings Involving Professionals Appearing or Practicing Before the
Commission, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-6783; 34-25893; 35-24676; 39-2175, File No. S7-2686 (July 7, 1988), availableat 1988 S.E.C. LEXIS 1365.

83. See id.
84. See generally id.
85. See supratext accompanying footnotes 79-81.
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when the SEC attempted to regulate attorney conduct outside the Rule
102 context.
For instance, in In re Kern,86 an SEC administrative law judge
concluded that a lawyer serving as outside counsel of a corporation
failed to amend his client's prior filing with the SEC to reflect more
recent developments during the course of a tender offer, thereby causing
his client to violate the disclosure provisions of the Exchange Act. The
SEC, citing to a lack of authority, discontinued the proceedings against
the attorney.
In another decision, In re Gutfreund, Strauss & Meriwether,87 an
SEC judge concluded that a chief officer at a broker-dealer who was
informed of a corporate officer's criminal wrongdoing had an obligation
"to take affirmative steps to ensure that appropriate action is taken to
address the misconduct," including "disclosure of the matter to the
entity's board of directors,
resignation from the firm, or disclosure to
88
regulatory authorities.,
Similarly, in 1997, the SEC issued another report of investigation in
a matter involving officers and directors of W.R. Grace Co.8 9 The SEC
concluded that these individuals failed to take action to ensure complete
and prompt disclosure of substantial retirement benefits and
compensation the corporation had agreed to pay to its former Chief
Executive Officer in the company's annual report, a 10-K filing, and a
proxy statement. 90 The SEC issued the report "to emphasize the
affirmative responsibilities of corporate officers and directors to ensure
that the shareholders whom they serve receive accurate and complete
disclosure of information required by the proxy solicitation
and periodic
91
reporting provisions of the federal securities laws."

86. 50 S.E.C. 596 (June 21, 1991).
87. 51 S.E.C. 93 (Dec. 3, 1992).
88.

Id. at 113-14.

89. See Report of Investigation Pursuant to section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 Concerning the Conduct of Certain Former Officers and Directors of W.R. Grace & Co., 1997
S.E.C. LEXIS 2038 (Sep. 30, 1997). It is important to note that these officers were not attorneys
though this SEC report does shed light on its efforts to regulate professional conduct.
90.

See id.

91. See id. at *3. While none of those targeted in the report were lawyers, the report
insinuated the SEC's continual yearning to regulate professional conduct and impose affirmative
obligations on professionals to ensure the accuracy of SEC filings. Specifically, the report
emphasized the affirmative duty of an issuer's management to correct misconduct and make full
disclosure of relevant matters to investors; the very methodology the SEC sought to impose on
attorneys in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
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The history of the SEC's attempts to regulate the professional
conduct of securities attorneys has planted the foundations for the
current debate. Several clear themes are derived from this history: the
SEC has long desired to regulate attorney conduct on its own without
heeding to a judicial determination of misconduct; the state bar
associations and practitioners have long resisted the SEC's regulation
and disciplining of attorneys outside the Rule 102 framework; and the
SEC has continually failed to firmly establish comprehensive standards
of attorney conduct. With the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and its
congressional delegation of power to the SEC, the agency seized the
opportunity to pursue its regulatory goals on the professional conduct
front with renewed vigor.
III.

THE CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION OF SECTION

307

On January 29, 2003, the SEC adopted final rules under Section
307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, establishing standards of conduct for
attorneys "appearing and practicing before the Commission" on behalf
of an issuer. 92 The new rules potentially redefine the relationship
between public companies and their attorneys.93 Specifically, Section
307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires that the SEC
issue rules, in the public interest and for the protection of investors,
setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys
appearing and practicing before the Commission in any way in the
representation of issuers, including a rule(1) requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of
securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the
company or any agent thereof, to the chief legal counsel or the chief
executive officer of the company (or the equivalent thereof); and
(2) if the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to the
evidence (adopting, as necessary, appropriate remedial measures or
sanctions with respect to the violation), requiring the attorney to report
the evidence to the audit committee of the board of directors of the
issuer or to another committee of the board of directors comprised

92. See Final Rule, supra note 10.
93. See id. SEC Rule 205, 17 C.F.R. Part 205, the lawyer conduct rule for attorneys appearing
and practicing before the Commission, became effective August 5, 2003.
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solely of directors not employed
directly or indirectly by the issuer, or
9
to the board of directors.
The SEC accordingly circulated rules for public comment on this
important initiative.
Generally, the new rules impose an "up-the-ladder" reporting
obligation on attorneys if they come in contact with evidence of a
material violation of either federal or state law or a breach of a fiduciary
duty by an issuer or any of its directors, officers, employees or agents. In
addition, a proposed rule that has not been made final and is still being
assessed by the SEC requires attorneys to make a "noisy withdrawal"
from representing the issuer. 95 This noisy withdrawal obligation would
be triggered when, after reporting evidence of a material violation up the
ladder, the attorney reasonably believes that the issuer's directors did not
appropriately respond within a reasonable time.
The new rules adopted by the Commission apply to all attorneys
"appearing and practicing before the Commission.' 96 The phrase
"appearing and practicing before the Commission" is broadly defined to
include:
(i) Transacting any business with the Commission,
communications in any form;

including

(ii) Representing an issuer in a Commission administrative proceeding
or in connection with any Commission investigation, inquiry,
information request, or subpoena;
(iii) Providing advice in respect of the United States securities laws or
the Commission's rules or regulations thereunder regarding any
document that the attorney has notice will be filed with or submitted
to, or incorporated into any document that will be filed with or
submitted to, the Commission, including the provision of such advice
in the context of preparing, or participating in the preparation of, any
such document;
(iv) Advising an issuer as to whether information or a statement,
opinion, or other writing is required under the securities laws or the
Commission's rules or regulations thereunder to be filed with or

94. See Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 7.
95. See Final Rule, supra note 10.
96. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(a) (2004).
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submitted to, or incorporated into97any document that will be filed with
or submitted to, the Commission.
The definition covers almost all attorneys who perform legal services for
public companies. The specific obligations and procedures the rules
impose on these attorneys will now be discussed in greater detail.
A.

SEC Rule 205

The rules require attorneys to report to company officials any
"evidence of a material violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary
duty or similar violation by the issuer or any agent thereof., 98 The
attorney must act when he or she becomes aware of information that
would lead a reasonable attorney to believe a material violation has
occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur. 99 This limits the instances in

which the reporting duty arises to situations where it is appropriate to
protect investors.100
As defined in the rules, "evidence of a material violation" means
"credible evidence, based upon which it would be unreasonable, under
the circumstances, for a prudent and competent attorney not to conclude
that it is reasonably likely that a material violation has occurred, is
ongoing, or is about to occur." 10 ' A "material violation" is a violation of
02
an applicable federal or state securities law, a breach of fiduciary duty,'10 3
or a similar violation of any federal or state law which is material.

Furthermore, the Commission noted in the final rule 0 4 that the term

97. See id.
98. See Final Rule, supra note 10.
99. See id at 6.
100. Seeid.at35.
101. Seeid.at9.
102. Generally, two fiduciary duties exist under most state business corporation statues, the
duty of care and the duty of loyalty. Directors and officers of the corporation owe these duties to the
corporation and its shareholders. The duty of care requires that corporate managers "discharge their
duties in the honest belief that the action taken was in the 'best interests of the company.' Best
interests will be met if the board can show 'any rational business purpose' for the action." J.Robert
Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in the Governance of Public Companies, 38
RICH. L. REV. 317, 340 (2004) (footnote omitted). The duty of loyalty protects against self-dealing
by officers and directors by ensuring fairness in conflicts of interest transactions undertaken by
corporate management. See id.
at 342.
103. Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 7.
104. See Final Rule, supra note 10.
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1697

"material"
has a well-settled meaning under the federal securities
05
1
laws.
Whether there is "evidence of a material violation," which triggers
an attorney's reporting obligations under the rules, is based on an
objective standard rather than the subjective belief of the attorney. 106 The
"circumstances" upon which the conduct of an attorney will be based are
the circumstances existing at the time the attorney makes a decision as to
whether or not there is evidence of a material violation that must be
reported. 10 7 Among other things, these circumstances may include the
attorney's professional skills, background and experience, the time
constraints under which the attorney is acting, the attorney's previous
experience and familiarity with the client and the availability of other
attorneys with whom the attorney may consult.'8
B. Reporting "Up the Ladder"
Rule 205 sets forth several alternatives for reporting the material
violations up the ladder. 10 9 The attorney is initially directed to make a
report to the issuer's chief legal officer ("CLO"), or to the issuer's chief
executive officer ("CEO")." 0 Absent exigent circumstances, the attorney
is also obligated to take reasonable steps to document his or her reports,
as well as any response received from the CLO or CEO and retain the
documentation for a reasonable time."'
After receiving an attorney's report, the CLO is required to
investigate the material violation and to determine if a material violation
has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur." 2 If the CLO concludes
that no material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur,
105. See id. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-36 (1988) (holding that the
common test of materiality under federal securities laws is whether there is a substantial likelihood
that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by a reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the "total mix" of information made available).
106.

See U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, SEC Adopts Attorney Conduct Rules under Sarbanes-

Oxley Act (Jan. 23, 2003), availableat http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-13.htm.
107.
108.

See id.
See id.

109. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(c) (2004).
110. See Disclosure Required by sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 68
Fed. Reg. 5110 (Jan. 31, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, and 249). See also
Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, 67 Fed. Reg. 57276 (Sept.
9, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 232, 240, 249, 270, and 274) (adopting new rule
as directed by 302(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
11. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1).
112. See 17 C.F.R. §205.3(2).
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the CLO must communicate this information to the attorney who
reported the violation and indicate his or her basis for the determination
that no material violation is evident.' 1 3 If the CLO concludes that a
material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur, the
to
CLO must take reasonable steps to devise an "appropriate response"
14
counsel.'
outside
to
resolution
this
communicate
and
the violation
A response is "appropriate" when the reporting attorney reasonably
believes that the issuer's response shows that there is no material
violation, that the issuer has undertaken appropriate remedial measures,
or that the issuer has retained or directed an attorney to review the matter
and has implemented corrective measures.' 1 5 Alternatively, if the
reporting attorney has advised the issuer that it has a valid colorable
defense to the violation, then the issuer is not required to make any
response." 6 If the attorney who reported the violation is satisfied with
both the CLO's response and the timing of the response, the obligation
to report the evidence further up the ladder is no longer required."'
If the reporting attorney reasonably concludes that the CLO's
response to the evidence of a material violation is insufficient or the
reporting attorney determines that reporting the violation to the CLO
would be futile, he or she is further obligated to report the violation
further up the ladder to the issuer's board of directors, to the audit
committee, or another board committee. 18 The reporting attorney must
present evidence of the material violation to one of the following
entities: the audit committee of the issuer's board of directors; another
committee of the issuer's board of directors consisting solely of directors
who are not employed, directly or indirectly, by the issuer; or the
issuer's board of directors (if the issuer's board of directors has no
committee consisting solely of directors who are not employed by the
issuer).'l9
The entity to which the report is made is then obligated to
investigate the evidence and provide an "appropriate response" to the
evidence of a material violation.' 20 This response must be communicated

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

See id.
See id.
See 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(b).
Seeid.
See id.
See 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(3)(A).
See 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(k).
See id.
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to the reporting attorney.12 If the reporting attorney reasonably believes
that the entity to whom the violation was reported has fashioned an
no further reporting
appropriate response, the reporting attorney is under
122
obligation with respect to that material violation.
C. OptionalReporting Out
Section 205.3(d) permits, but does not expressly require, an
attorney to divulge a client's confidences to the SEC.1 23 This provision
would permit attorneys to do so upon the happening of three
occurrences.1 24 Under this provision, an attorney "may reveal...
confidential information" to the SEC "to the extent the attorney
reasonably believes is necessary":
(i) To prevent the issuer from committing a material violation [of the
securities laws] that is likely to cause substantial injury to the financial
interest or property of the issuer or investors;
(ii) To prevent the issuer, in a Commission investigation or
administrative proceeding from committing perjury... or committing
any act proscribed in 18 U.S.C. 1001 that is likely to perpetuate a fraud
upon the Commission; or
(iii) To rectify the consequences of a material violation by the issuer
that caused, or may cause, substantial injury to the financial interest or
in the furtherance of which the
property of the issuer or the investors
25
attorney's services were used.1
The state bar associations find these permitted126 disclosures to be
problematic and inconsistent with state ethics rules.
Specifically, the SEC's permitted disclosure scenarios can
potentially allow an attorney to disclose confidences to the SEC to
prevent a civil securities law violation not arising to the level of a crime.
Some state ethics rules do not permit such disclosures in non-criminal
circumstances. For instance, New York Disciplinary Rule 1200.19, like
Washington State's rule on the subject, permits attorneys to disclose
client confidences necessary to prevent the client from committing a
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

See id.
See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(8).
See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d).
See id.
See id.
See infra notes 176-186 and 230-243 and accompanying text.
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crime. 127 Moreover, committing a violation of the securities laws
resulting in damage to financial interests or property of investors would
also be barred under some state laws that do not permit disclosure in
non-criminal circumstances. Consequently, the optional disclosure
framework set forth in Section 205 is important to the preemption issue
as the permissive disclosures may subject attorneys to differing legal
rules at the state and federal level.
D. The Still-Pending "Noisy Withdrawal" Requirement
The most controversial part of the SEC's proposed rule that is still
pending is the so-called "noisy withdrawal" or reporting out obligation.
After reporting evidence of a material violation up the ladder, if an
attorney reasonably believes that the issuer's directors did not make an
appropriate response 128 within a reasonable time to address the evidence
of the material violation, and if the attorney believes that the material
violation is "likely to result in substantial injury to the financial interest
or property of the issuer or of investors,"1 29 he or she would30 be required
to make a "noisy withdrawal" from representing the issuer.'
Along these lines, there are two alternatives an unsatisfied reporting
attorney can pursue. First, under one of the alternatives of the proposed
rule, a reporting attorney who has not received an "appropriate
response" from the issuer and who believes that the material violation is
"likely to result in substantial injury to the financial interest or property
of the issuer or of investors" would be required to withdraw from
representing the issuer and notify the SEC in writing.'13 Within one day,
the reporting attorney would have to notify the SEC in writing that he or
she has withdrawn from representing the issuer and that the reporting
attorney intends to disaffirm some representation in a document to be
filed with the SEC or incorporated into a document to be filed with the
Commission. 132 In addition, the reporting attorney would have to
actually disaffirm in writing the information causing the material
violation. 133

127.
128.
129.
130.

See
See
See
See

22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 1200.19 (2004).
17 C.F.R. § 205.2.
C.F.R. § 205.3.
id.

131. See C.F.R. § 205.3(d); Final Rule, supranote 10.
132. See Final Rule, supra note 10.
133.

See id.
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Under the second alternative of the proposed rule, a reporting
attorney who did not receive an "appropriate response" from the issuer
and who believes that the material violation will result in an injury to
investors would be required to withdraw from representation of the
issuer. 134 Following the receipt of the written notice of withdrawal from
the reporting attorney, the issuer would be required to report the
withdrawal and the circumstances surrounding it to the SEC on Form 8K. 135 The Form 8-K would have to be filed with the Commission within
two business days of receipt of the notice of withdrawal. 3 6 If the issuer
fails to file the required notice on Form 8-K, the reporting attorney may
to file the Form 8-K and disclose the
report the issuer's failure
13 7
SEC.
the
to
withdrawal
The controversy in the noisy withdrawal section, as relevant to this
Note, lies in the SEC's authority to enact such broad regulations and its
potential preemption on existing state ethics rules. 138 The American Bar
Association Model Rules and the ethics rules adopted by many state
supreme courts permit some form of noisy withdrawal.1 39 Opponents of
the current pending noisy withdrawal argue that the SEC's version
transcends those state ethics rules and would problematically impose this

134. See Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date,
Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-8106, 34-46084 at * 18 (June 17, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 228, 229, 240, and 249).
135. See id. at *11. A Form 8-K is filed when a company experiences a material event that
shareholders would attach importance to. For more on Form 8-K see generally, Edmund W. Kitch,
The Theory And PracticeOf Securities Disclosure,61 BROOK. L. REV. 763 (1995).
136. Seeid
137. See id. at *96.
138. It should be noted, that the noisy withdrawal section is controversial in many other
respects. For instance, commentators have argued that the provision "would undermine the attorneyclient privilege and turn lawyers into government informants." Jonathan Weil & Cassell BryanLow, Report Bolsters SEC's Proposalfor Attorneys, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2003, at CI. Those in
favor of the noisy withdrawal section cite to a case where the existence of such a provision would
have prevented investor harm. See id. Following retailer Spiegel, Inc.'s implosion, a bankruptcy
court-appointed examiner explained that Spiegel's advisors could have prevented investor losses.
After learning of accounting irregularities and other substantive problems with SEC periodic filings,
the company's auditors, KPMG, "stood by... did not make a report to Spiegel's board, did not
resign and did not report the matter to the SEC." Id. Additionally, Spiegel's attorney, who
repeatedly advised the company that withholding public disclosures of their debt was illegal, did not
withdraw "noisily or otherwise." Id. Of this behavior the court-appointed examiner suggested that
"the absence of a 'noisy withdrawal' requirement allowed Spiegel to keep investors and the SEC in
the dark." Id.
139.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002). For a discussion on the differing

state rules in this area, See, e.g. Thomas D. Morgan & Ronald D. Rotunda, 2003 SELECTED
STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (2003).
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broad rule by federal regulation.140 Essentially, they contest and question
the SEC's position that this rule, if enacted (and the optional reporting
out rule already enacted), would preempt state ethics rules.
IV.

THE BAR ASSOCIATIONS, PREEMPTION AND RULE 205

141
The federal preemption doctrine has been dubbed an enigma.
One commentator recounts that his grandfather made him promise three
things on his deathbed, one of which was to "never read a Supreme
Court decision dealing with federal preemption., 142 Another
commentator cites to the "fundamental confusion in the thinking of
143
judges and scholars alike about the underlying nature of preemption."'
Furthermore, what contributes to the muddled nature of preemption is
that the study of preemption itself has been marginalized by
constitutional law scholars. 144
Scholars and courts alike generally express the belief that the
federal preemption doctrine derives from the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution. 45 The Supremacy Clause in Article Four,
Clause Two of the Constitution, states that

the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;

and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in 46the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 1

140. This will be discussed in greater detail in text accompanying infra notes 178-186 and 230243.
141. See, e.g., David E. Seidelson, Express FederalPreemption Provisions,State Law Actions
for Damages, Congress, and the Supreme Court: A Penitent Seeks Redemption, 58 LA. L. REV. 145,
145 (1997); Stephen D. Kinnard, Judicial Refusal to Apply ERISA Preemption to Tort Actions
Against Health Care Providers, 26 THE BRIEF 24, 29 (1997).
142. Seidelson, supra note 141, at 145.
143. Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 768 (1994).
144. There have been many articles that discuss preemption as applied to specific state and
federal conflicts but few that discuss preemption generally. See, e.g., Gardbaum, supra note 143; S.
Candice Hoke, Preemptive Pathologiesand Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REV. 685 (1991).
145. See, e.g., Netland v. Hess & Clark, 140 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1015 (D. Minn. 2001)
(beginning preemption analysis with citation to the Supremacy Clause in the Constitution). Contra
Gardbaum, supra note 143, at 770 (arguing that "[i]n reality, the Supremacy Clause adds nothing to
what should be a question of interpreting what Congress has in fact done" and further suggesting
that the connection between the Supremacy Clause and preemption analysis is a result of "muddled
thinking about preemption and supremacy").
146. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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It is a well-established principle that the Supremacy Clause
invalidates state laws that "interfere with, or are contrary to" federal
law. 147 The preemption question therefore necessarily focuses on
interpretation of statutes and legislative history; interpretation that is
guided by a series of principles originating from the vast amount of
Supreme Court jurisprudence addressing potential and actual federal and
state law conflicts.
A.

Supreme CourtJurisprudenceon Preemption

The United States Supreme Court has held that a finding of
preemption is only proper when Congress's intent to supersede state law
is "clear and manifest."'' 48 Such intent may be explicit in the language of
the statute, or implicit in the statute's structure and purpose. 4 9 When a
state law is expressly preempted, "the only question for courts [is]
whether the challenged state law is one that the federal law is intended to
preempt."' 50 Alternatively, when Congress invokes implied preemption,
courts are forced to search beyond the actual language of the federal
statute in their
evaluation of whether federal purposes are frustrated by
5
state law.'
Congressional intent to preempt is assessed by examining a
statute's language and legislative history.' 52 Absent express or implied
congressional intent that a federal statute occupies the field of authority
in a particular area, state regulation still may be preempted if it conflicts
153
with the federal statute.
As the Supreme Court stated in Rice v. Santa
54
1
Corp.
Elevator
Fe
[The congressional] purpose may be evidenced in several ways. The
scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to
supplement it. Or the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the
federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed
147. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1,211 (1824).
148. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).
149. See id.
150. The Supremacy Clause and Federal Preemption. The issue: How should courts determine
whether a federal law preempts state law?, at http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/
ftrials/conlaw/preemption.htm.
151.

See id.

152. See Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Snead, 441 U.S. 141, 146-51 (1979); see also Northern
States Power, 447 F.2d at 1146.
153. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
154.

331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
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to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject. Likewise,
the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of
the obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purposes.155
Congress's intent to preempt all state law in a particular area may
be inferred where the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently
comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress "left no
room" for supplementary state regulation.' 56 Preemption of a whole field
will be inferred where the field is one in which "the federal interest is so
dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude
enforcement of state laws on the same subject."' 57 Thus, the Court may
find "occupation preemption" where an extensive federal regulatory
scheme exists, where a significant federal interest exists, or where
58
federal law regulates for the same purpose as a state law.'
Direct conflict preemption occurs if a court finds that "compliance
' 59
with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility."'
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that such a situation may assume
one of many names including, "conflicting," "contrary to,"
"repugnance,"
"difference,"
"irreconcilability,"
"inconsistency,"
"violation," "curtailment," or "interference."'' 60 A state law conflicting
with federal law is also preempted when the state law frustrates
Congress' accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of the
federal law.161
The "conflict" test is used to assess whether the state regulation
"stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress."'' 62 As stated in Florida Avocado
Growers v. Paul,163 "[a] holding of federal exclusion of state law is
inescapable and requires no inquiry into congressional design where
compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical
impossibility."'' 64 It is "often a perplexing question whether Congress

155. Id. (citations omitted).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. N.E. Hub, 239 F.3d 333, 346 (2001).
159. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983).
160. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000) (internal quotations omitted).
161. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 204 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941)).
162. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430
U.S. 519, 526 (1977)).
163. 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
164. Id.
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has precluded state action or by the choice of selective regulatory
measures has left the police power of the
States undisturbed except as
165
the state and federal regulations collide.,
A state law that may come into conflict with federal law is not
necessarily preempted; however, it might be preempted if the state
measure seeks to achieve a different purpose or objective. 166 Even
similarity of purpose between state and federal laws does not necessarily
compel a finding of preemption. 167 Accordingly, in City of Philadelphia
v. New Jersey,1 68 the Supreme Court found that a state measure "is not
preempted because of a square conflict with particular provisions of
federal law or because of general incompatibility with basic federal
objectives." 169 This is particularly true when the state measure "can be
enforced consistently with the program
goals and the respective federal' 170
state roles intended by Congress."
When applying preemption analysis, the Supreme Court generally
presumes that the "historic police powers of the States [are] not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress."' 7' The Court uses this rule to ensure that it "will
not be presumed that a federal statute was intended to supersede the
exercise of the power of the state unless there is clear manifestation of
intention to do so. The exercise of federal supremacy is not lightly to be
presumed."'' 72 Additionally, the Court has indicated that federal-state
conflicts must be genuine and significant in order to merit resolution by
preemption. '73
The Court prefers to reconcile and uphold federal and state
provisions that potentially conflict, rather than invalidate the entire state
law. The Court has stressed the importance of the "body of law relating
to the sensitive interrelationship between statutes adopted by the
separate yet coordinate, federal and state sovereignties" and has stated
that "the proper approach is to reconcile the operation of both statutory

165. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. at 230-3 1.
166. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 164 (1978) (state enforcement of laws
for other purposes is permissible).
167. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 132 (1978).
168. 437 U.S. 617, 621 n.4. (1978).
169. Id.
170. Id. (citations omitted).
171. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. at 230.
172. New York State Dep't of Soc. Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973) (quoting
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952)).
173. Exxon Corp., 437 U.S. at 130; New York State Dep't ofSoc. Serv., 413 U.S. at 423 n.29.
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' 74
schemes with one another rather than holding one completely ousted.'
Moreover, the Court has expressed its strong preference for resolving
federal-state preemption conflicts "only to the extent
necessary to
175
protect the achievement of the aims of the federal law."'
Another related element to the preemption analysis is the interplay
between preemption and the Tenth Amendment. The Supremacy Clause
is arguably limited by the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution, which
provides that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people."' 76 The Tenth Amendment "expressly
declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power
in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function
effectively in a federal system.' ' 177 The reading of the Tenth Amendment
78
in this manner has been the subject of much constitutional debate. 1

B.

The Washington State Bar Association Opinion

On June 26, 2003, the Board of Governors for the Washington State
Bar Association unanimously approved and adopted an interim formal
ethics opinion addressing obligations of Washington State lawyers under
the SEC's professional conduct rules regarding, reporting, disclosure and
or withdrawal under certain circumstances. 79 The Washington State Bar
Association was troubled by the SEC's proposed noisy withdrawal
requirement as well as the SEC's statement that a lawyer who complies
in good faith "shall not be subject to discipline or otherwise liable under

174. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127 (1973) (quoting Silver
v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963)).
175. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 358 n.5 (1976) (quoting in part Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner& Smith, 414 U.S. at 127).
176. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
177. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 843 (1976) (quoting Fry v. United States,
421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)).
178. The detail of this constitutional debate is beyond the scope of this Note. For a discussion
on this debate see generally, Barry Latzer, Whose Federalism? or, Why "Conservative" States
Should Develop Their State ConstitutionalLaw, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1399 (1998); Peter A. Lauricella,
The Real "Contract With America ": The Original Intent of the Tenth Amendment and the
Commerce Clause, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1377 (1997); David M. Sprick, Ex Abundanti Cautela (Out of
an Abundance of Caution): A HistoricalAnalysis of the Tenth Amendment and the Continuing

Dilemma Over "Federal"Power, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 529 (1999).
179. See Washington Bar Opinion, supra note 29. The opinion was labeled "interim" because
of the "lack of case law about the extent to which the SEC Regulations ... pre-empt state ethics
rules and because a Washington State Bar Association committee is considering changes to RPC
1.6." Id.
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inconsistent standards
imposed by any state or other United States
180

jurisdiction."'

The SEC rule allowing lawyers to disclose civil violations that do
not rise to the level of crimes is in conflict with Rule 1.6 of the State of
Washington's Rules of Professional Conduct, which permits attorneys to
disclose a client's confidences and secrets, 8 1 only "to the extent the
lawyer reasonably believes necessary... to prevent the client from
committing a crime.', 182 The conflict therefore lies in the SEC's rule
permitting an attorney to disclose confidences and secrets in situations
not authorized or allowed by Washington's Section 1.6.
The interim opinion warns Washington State lawyers not to
disclose client information allowed by the SEC regulations unless such
disclosures are also permitted by the state's own professional conduct
rules. 183 The Washington Bar also warned Washington state lawyers not
to rely on the "good faith" provision found in the SEC Rule. 8 4 This
provision protects attorneys from potential disciplinary action due to
inconsistent state standards if the attorney "complies in good faith" with
the SEC's regulations. 85 According to the Board of Governors, a
Washington state lawyer who "takes action contrary to this formal
opinion cannot as a defense against [a state ethics] violation fairly claim
I8 6
to be complying in good faith with the SEC Regulations."'
This is based on "the fact that Section 205(d)(2) states that a lawyer
'may reveal' confidential information but does not mandate a revelation
[thereby] giv[ing] the lawyer discretion to determine whether to make a
disclosure" that would not be permitted under Washington's ethical
rules. Furthermore, the Board was of the opinion that "the use of the
term 'complies' in Section 205.6(c) means that the good faith defense
applies only to those provisions which are mandatory in nature and not
187
to discretionary disclosures."'

180. Id.
181. Seeid.
182. Id.
183. See Mark Hansen, State Fights the SEC: State Bar Warns Lawyers Against Permissive
Disclosureunder SEC's New Rules, A.B.A. J. E-REPORT, Aug. 29, 2003.

184. See Washington Bar Opinion, supra note 29.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187.

Id.
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C. The SEC's Position on Preemption
At the outset of the SEC's proposal to regulate attorney conduct,
the SEC stated that
the prospect of simultaneous Commission and state disciplinary
proceedings for the same misconduct raises the question of the impact
of the rule upon state ethical rules and regulations. Due to the breadth
and specificity of the Congressional mandate to the Commission to
implement an 'up the ladder' reporting system applicable to attorneys
representing issuers, the Commission is considering whether Congress
intended for the agency's rule to 'occupy the field' on this issue, and
whether Part 205 would preempt any state rules governing the
reporting of evidence of a material
violation by attorneys representing
188
issuers before the Commission.
Prior to the adoption of the interim opinion, the SEC general
counsel sent a published letter to Washington State Bar Officials urging
them not to adopt the opinion. 18 9 The SEC general counsel, Giovanni P.
Prezioso, argued that the interim opinion squarely conflicts with several
Supreme Court precedents that have upheld the authority of federal
administrative agencies to promulgate rules that differ from state laws. 190
Specifically, the general counsel suggested that where state law
prescribes an attorney from exercising the discretion allowed by a
federal regulation, the federal regulation trumps the state measure.191
Accordingly, because "the issue of whether an attorney has acted in
good faith ... requires an interpretation of a Commission rule [the good
' 92
faith provision], states must defer to the Commission's construction."
Despite the SEC general counsel's letter, the Board of Governors
adopted the interim opinion. As a result of the seemingly irreconcilable
positions of the SEC and the Washington State Bar Association, one
commentator has stated that Washington lawyers "will naturally be
concerned that such disclosure will result in state disciplinary sanctions,

188. 67. Fed. Reg. 71697-98 (footnotes omitted).
189. See General Counsel, Giovanni P. Prezioso, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
Public Statement by SEC Official: Letter Regarding Washington State Bar Association's Bar
Opinion on the Effect of the SEC's Attorney Conduct Rules, July 23, 2003, at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch072303gpp.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2004) [hereinafter, SEC

Letter].
190.
191.

These cases will be discussed infra at notes 199-230 and accompanying text.
See SEC Letter, supra note 189.

192. SEC Letter, supra note 189 (citing Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002) (sustaining
agency's interpretation of a regulation as long as it is based on a permissible construction)).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol32/iss4/23

28

Levy: The SEC, the States and Attorney Conduct Rules: An Analysis of Pr

2004]

THE SEC AND THE STA TES

at least in the absence of a definitive ruling that the SEC rule pre-empts
the state ethics standards."' 93 "The practical reality is that Washington
lawyers are likely for now to limit their disclosures to what the
Washington state ethical standards permit, and not take full advantage of
the scope of permissive disclosure under the SEC rule."' 9 4 Thus, the
conflict persists and preemption remains an important concern.
Most states permit an attorney to reveal confidences and secrets "in
order to prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent
act."' 95 Additionally, these states "either permit or require disclosure to
prevent a client from perpetuating a fraud that constitutes a crime, and
eighteen states permit or require disclosure to rectify substantial loss
resulting from client crime or fraud in which the client used the lawyer's
services."' 196 This leaves a handful of states that require such disclosure
and thirty-seven that permit it. As a result, the SEC rules-and state ethics
rules are discordant in some capacity and the preemption debate
transcends Washington State; its outcome will have far-reaching
implications.
At the outset, the SEC general counsel's letter explained that the
SEC's rules rarely conflict with state ethics rules. 197 This is due in part to
the narrow scope and applicability of the Commission's rules that only
apply

to

"attorneys ... appearing

and

practicing

before

the

Commission."' 98 Thus, lawyers not appearing before the SEC will not
encounter the conflict between the SEC rules and Washington State's
ethics rules. Furthermore, the letter illustrates that barring Washington
attorneys from complying with the Commission's rules is inconsistent
99 and
with Supreme Court precedent, namely Sperry v. State of Florida,1
2
°°
Fidelity FederalSavings & Loan Association v. de la Cuesta.
In Sperry, the petitioner was registered to practice before the United
States Patent Office, but not admitted to practice law before the Florida
or any other bar. 20 1 Petitioner appealed a lower court order enjoining him

193. Hansen, supra note 183.
194. Id.
195. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 67 cmt. F (2000).
196. ABA Task Force, Preliminary Report of the ABA Task Force on Corporate Responsibility
at 32 (July 16, 2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/
preliminaryreport.pdf.
197. See SEC Letter, supranote 189.
198. Id.
199. 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
200. 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
201. 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
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from practicing before the Patent Office, and the issue on appeal was
whether he was permitted to represent clients before the United States
Patent Office.20 2 The Supreme Court held that under the Supremacy
Clause, federal law, which permitted non-lawyers to represent applicants
20 3
before the Patent Office under 35 U.S.C. § 31, preempted Florida law.
The order enjoining petitioner was therefore vacated because it
prohibited him from performing tasks which were incident to the
preparation and prosecution of patent applications before the United
States Patent Office. 204
The basis for the Supreme Court's decision was the federal patent
statute's authorizing the Commissioner of Patents to "prescribe
regulations governing the recognition and conduct of agents, attorneys,
or other persons representing applicants or other parties before the Patent
Office" providing the Commissioner of Patents with adequate authority
to promulgate a rule preempting a Florida law requiring attorneys to be
licensed by the state.20 5 The Court expressly stated that "by virtue of the
Supremacy Clause, Florida may not deny to those failing to meet its own
qualifications the right to perform the functions within the scope of the
federal authority.' 20 6 Ultimately, relevant to the professional
responsibility context, the Court opined that the "authority of Congress
is no less when the state power which it displaces would otherwise have
been exercised by the state judiciary rather than by the state
legislature. 20 7
The other case cited by the general counsel to support the SEC's
preemption position was Fidelity FederalSavings & Loan Association v.
de la Cuesta.208 In Fidelity, at issue was a federal statute, the Federal
Owners' Loan Act of 1933, which authorized the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board to promulgate rules governing savings and loan
associations. One of the promulgated regulations permitted federal
savings and loan associations to include a "due on sale" clause in its loan
documentation. 2 0 9 A savings and loan bank challenged a decision of the

202.
203.

See id.
See id.

204. See id.
205. Id. at 385 (emphasis added).
206.
207.
208.

Id.
Id.
458 U.S. 141 (1982).

209. Id. A due on sale clause is a clause "that accelerates the loan whenever the debtor sells the
collateral to a third party." David Gray Carlson, Rake's Progress: Cure and Reinstatement of
Secured Claims in Bankruptcy Reorganization, 13 BANK. DEV. J. 273, 287 (1997).
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Court of Appeals of California, denying the bank's motion for summary
judgment in an action for a judicial declaration that a due on sale clause
was not enforceable unless the bank first showed the transfer of real
property had harmed its security interest. 21 0 California challenged the
federal regulation, contending that the regulation violated a California
statute that only permitted a lender to exercise a due on sale clause
where the lender first demonstrates that the borrower's transfer of the
property harms the lender's security interest. 21 ' Appellee, home
purchasers, requested an injunction, compensatory damages and punitive
damages.2 12
Reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court held that there
was ample federal statutory authority allowing the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board, a federal administrative agency, to displace contrary
restrictions imposed by the state.21 3 The state law framework created the
sort of conflicting state limitation that the federal regulations were aimed
at preventing. 214 The Court granted appellant's motion for summary
judgment ultimately holding that federal law controlled.
The SEC general counsel letter also concluded that states must
defer to the Commission's construction of what constitutes "good faith"
compliance with the SEC rules.2 15 In support of this proposition, the
letter cites to a recently decided Supreme Court case, Barnard v.
Walton.216 In Barnard,at issue was a social security regulation coupled
with an agency interpretation. The Social Security Act authorizes
payment of Title II disability insurance benefits and Title XVI
Supplemental Security Income to individuals who have an "inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable... impairment... which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. 21 7 The Social
Security Administration, a federal agency, denied benefits to respondent
Walton, finding that his "inability"
to engage in substantial gainful
218
months.
eleven
only
lasted
activity

210.

458 U.S. 141 (1982).

211. Seeid.
212. See id.
213. See id.
214.

See id.

215.
216.
217.
218.

SEC Letter, supra note 189.
535 U.S. 212 (2002).
Id.
at 214.
Id. at 215.
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The district court affirmed the denial of benefits.2 19 On appeal to
the Fourth Circuit, the court reversed the district court's holding that the
twelve month duration requirement modifies "impairment" not
"inability," that the statute leaves no doubt that no similar duration
requirement relates to an "inability." Therefore, the Fourth Circuit held
that Walton was entitled to benefits despite the federal agency's
regulations restricting them to those unable to work for twelve
months.2 20 On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the Agency's reading
of the term "inability" was reasonable.22 '
The Supreme Court explained that the statute requires both an
"inability" to engage in any substantial gainful activity and an
"impairment" providing "reason" for the "inability," adding that the
"impairment" must last or be expected to last not less than twelve
months.2 22 Along these lines, the Agency determined in its formal
regulations and its interpretation that "inability" must last the same
amount of time.223 Citing to several cases, the Court likened the dispute
at issue to other instances where the courts have granted considerable
leeway to the interpretation by an agency of its own regulations.224 Thus,
if an Agency's interpretation of a federal statute is "based on a
permissible construction," a court will uphold the agency interpretation.
In addition to Barnhart, the SEC letter cites to United States v.
Locke,225 and City of New York v. FCC.2 26 In United States v. Locke, the
Supreme Court invalidated state regulations governing oil spill remedies
that were more stringent than federal remedies. 7 The Court held that
state regulations conflicting with federal agency regulations pursuant to
a congressional mandate were preempted.228 Similarly, in New York v.
9
FCC.22 the Court held that the Federal Communications Commission
219. Seeid. at216.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id.
See id at 222, 224.
See id. at 218-19.
See id. at219.

224. Along these lines, the Court stated that
[i]f the statute speaks clearly to the precise question at issue, [courts] must give effect to
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, [courts] must sustain an Agency's
interpretation if it is based on a permissible construction of the Act.
Id. at 217-18.
225. 529
226. 486
227. 529
228. See
229. 486

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
id.
U.S.

108, 110 (2000).
57 (1989).
108, 110 (2000).
57 (1989).
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did not exceed its authority to promulgate rules that were contrary to
state cable rules. 230 The Court held the contrary state rules that frustrated
the purpose of the federal agency rules were preempted. Under the case
law cited in the SEC letter, if the SEC's attorney conduct regulations are
authorized under Section 307 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act, any state rules
frustrating the purpose underlying the SEC rules should presumably be
preempted.
D. Opinion of the CaliforniaBar's CorporationsCommittee
Similar to the Washington Bar Association's opinion, the
Corporations Committee of the Business Law section of the State Bar of
California sent a letter to the SEC general counsel. 231 The letter
responded to the SEC's position that SEC regulations trump state rules
232
of conduct prohibiting disclosure of confidences and secrets.
Additionally, the Corporations Committee, like the Washington Bar,
took issue with the notion that SEC regulations protect a lawyer from
discipline when the attorney complies in good faith with the SEC's
rules.233 Specifically, the letter stated that "[a]n attorney faced with
choosing between potentially irreparable harm to a client's interests
arising from disclosure of a confidence or the cost of a good faith, well
founded 4objection to the SEC's rules is virtually duty-bound to select the
latter."

23

Notwithstanding the SEC's seemingly plausible position, the
Committee explained that the "significant potential basis of the
challenge [is] that there is no evidence of Congressional intent to
preempt state ethics rules. 23 5 Additionally, the Committee noted past
instances where the "courts have struck down SEC rulemaking for lack
of authority.,

236

The Corporations Committee specifically warned that it is "the duty
of an attorney.., to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril
237
to himself or herself to preserve the secrets, of his or her client.,
Indeed, under the California Business and Professions Code section
230. See id.
231.
232.
233.
234.

See California Letter, supranote 30.
See id.
See id.
Id.

235. Id. (footnote omitted).
236. Id. (footnote omitted).
237.

Id.
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6068(e), an attorney who reports out is subject to discipline by the
California State Bar Association.23 8 Interestingly, California's State
Constitution specifically requires California State agencies to enforce
it,
state statutes notwithstanding any federal law purporting to preempt
239
law.
State
California
the
preempts
law
federal
that
finds
until a court
Ultimately, regarding the SEC's good faith provision, the
Corporations Committee sternly warned that "clients and lawyers could
be severely harmed if lawyers rely on the SEC's assurances ... that
good faith disclosures of client confidences will be immunized, but
courts ultimately rule that the positions taken [by the SEC] are
incorrect. '' 24 0 After articulating reasons why the SEC exceeded its
authority, including public policy problems created by allowing
disclosure of client confidences, the letter respectfully requested that the
SEC reconsider its positions.241
The Corporations Committee stressed the difficulty the SEC would
have in asserting preemption of California law.242 The letter sent to the
SEC indicated that the "Committee believes that the authority of the
SEC to adopt either Rule 205.3(d) or Rule 205.6(c) is likely to be
challenged., 243 The challenge will likely occur when a California lawyer
(or a Washington lawyer for that matter) is confronted with an issue that
will require compliance with the SEC rule, while concomitantly
disregarding the conflicting state rule.
The Committee letter also distinguishes Sperry v. State of
244 one of the cases cited to in the SEC letter in support of the
Florida,
238. BUS. AND PROF. CODE SEC. 6068(e) provides that "[i]t is the duty of an attorney... [t]o
maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to preserve the secrets, of
his or her client."
239. CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3.5 reads as follows:
An administrative agency, including an administrative agency created by the
Constitution or an initiative statute, has no power:
(c) To declare a statute unenforceable, or to refuse to enforce a statute on the basis that
federal law or federal regulations prohibit the enforcement of such statute unless an
appellate court has made a determination that the enforcement of such statute is
prohibited by federal law or federal regulations.
For examples of the courts applying this provision see, e.g., Regents of University of California v.
Superior Court, 225 Cal. App. 3d 972, 976 (Ct. App. Cal. 1990) and see generally Barlow v. Davis,
72 Cal. App. 4th 1258 (Ct. App. Cal. 1990).
240. California Letter, supra note 30.
241. See id.
242.

See id.

243. Id.
244. 373 U.S. 379 (1963). For a plenary discussion of this case, see supra notes 200-206 and
accompanying text.
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SEC's position. In this regard, the Committee illustrated the following
points:
First, the power of Congress to establish a patent office is expressly
set forth in the United States Constitution. Second, Congress expressly
granted the Commissioner of Patents the authority to prescribe
regulations, among other things, recognizing agents or other persons
before the Patent Office. Third, the practice by lay patent agents was
long-standing at the time that Congress considered the statute.245
Essentially, the Committee's contention was that the source of
authority for the rule promulgation in Sperry was stronger than that of
the SEC in the present context. The next Section assesses whether
California, Washington or any other conflicting state rule will be
preempted by the SEC's rules.
V.

APPLYING THE PREEMPTION ANALYSIS

When acting within constitutional limits, Congress is empowered to
preempt state law by stating so in express terms.246 For example, in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress could have said, "the regulations
promulgated pursuant to this congressional mandate hereby supercede
and preempt any existing and future state laws that conflict with or
impede their operation. 24 7 Congress, however, did not do so. We must
therefore search for implicit preemption.
When searching for implicit preemption we look to any
congressional intent with respect to whether congress intended for the
SEC to occupy the field. The federal regulations in question are not
sufficiently comprehensive to infer that, given the current SEC rules,
congress left no room for supplementary state regulation. It is also
difficult to argue that the federal government's interest in this area is
dominant and overwhelming so as to preclude state regulation.

245. See California Letter, supra note 30.
246. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
247. Congress has done this in several other important statutes. For example, in the
Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, better known as ERISA, Congress expressly
stated that ERISA laws "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to any employee benefit plan .. " 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2004). Similarly, in the recently
enacted Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA"), congress established that
any federal regulation resulting from implementation of the Act preempts any contrary state law.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1320 d-7(a)(l) (2004). An example of a less broad preemption provision is in the
Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 ("FRSA") where congress provided that a state may regulate
railroad safety until the secretary of transportation prescribes a regulation covering the subject
matter of the state requirement. See 49 U.S.C. § 20106 (2004).
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Perhaps, the more difficult part of the preemption analysis relates to
whether "compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical
impossibility. ' 48 If the state regulations that differ from the SEC rules
"stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress" a finding of preemption is a
possibility. 249 In the present conflict between the SEC and the states
complying with both the SEC rules and the Washington and California
rules relating to confidentiality may indeed be impossible. An in-house
attorney confronted with corporate fraud may be obligated by Section
205.3 to report the corporate malfeasance to the SEC. But by reporting
to the SEC, the same attorney may be violating state confidentiality rules
that subject him to discipline by these state bar associations. Thus,
compliance with both may very well be an impossibility.
In the present case, both Washington State and California (and
other states who have released public comments on the SEC proposals)
assert compelling state interests in support of their rules governing
confidentiality between attorneys and clients. 250 For these states, it is a
breach of the highest order when attorneys "blow the whistle" on their
clients and reveal their confidences and secrets, particularly to a
governmental agency with enforcement ability. By restricting the ability
of attorney disclosure, these states implicitly assert that the preservation
of client confidentiality is a pure and near-absolute value that should not
be forsaken, even when confronted with securities fraud and other
criminal acts.
Both Washington and California cite to the important policy
objectives being frustrated by the SEC's rule-making attempts. 25 1 The
California Committee's letter states that "the disclosure of confidential
information, including information protected by the attorney-client
privilege, could have devastating effects. The risk of waiving the
attorney-client privilege through the attorney's selective disclosure to the
SEC is high and may result in the information becoming available in
civil or criminal proceedings. 2 52 These compelling public policy
concerns, however, are not taken into account when a court undertakes
preemption review. Put another way, the presence of legitimate state

248. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co.,461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983).
249. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430
U.S. 519, 526 (1977)).

250. See Washington Opinion, supra note 29; California Letter, supranote 30.
251. See, e.g., Washington Opinion, supranote 29; see also, California Letter, supranote 30.
252. California Letter, supra note 30 (footnote omitted).
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interests in enacting statutes "does not inoculate them against
preemption. '' 253 Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that a state law does
not triumph over federal law because the subject matter is of special
concern to the states.254
One of the main bases of the Washington and California bars'
contention is that there is "no evidence of Congressional intent to
preempt state ethics rules., 255 As the argument goes, absent a
manifestation of intent to preempt state rules, federal supremacy "is not
lightly to be presumed., 256 It is important to note, that the preemption of
state ethics rules is not a stake in this dispute. The SEC has not
attempted to displace entire state ethics regimes. The SEC rule conflicts
with a single state ethics rule (albeit an important one). Furthermore, the
conflict only surfaces where the client confidentiality is disclosed by a
California or Washington
State attorney "appearing and practicing
257
before the Commission.,
The Supreme Court's preemption jurisprudence can be reduced to
several propositions that will undoubtedly be applied by any court
reviewing the dispute. These general propositions have been consistently
applied by the Supreme Court and lower federal courts undertaking
preemption review. While the factual contexts in different cases can be
distinguished, the following principles derived from these cases are not
as amenable to differing interpretations:
(1) "[T]he law of the State, though enacted in the exercise of powers not
contraverted, must yield when incompatible with federal
legislation. 25 8
(2) Federal regulations "have no less pre-emptive effect than federal
statutes. 259
(3) Congressional authority is "no less when the state power which it
displaces would otherwise have been exercised by the state judiciary
rather than by the state legislature. 2 6 °

253.

Roy Simon, Washington State Bar Takes on the SEC, N.Y. PROF'L RESP. REPORT, Oct.

2003, at 5.
254. See Fidelity Fed Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de laCuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
255. California Letter, supra note 30.
256. New York State Dep't of Soc. Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973) (quoting
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952)). This argument will be addressed in this Part.
257. See Final Rule, supra note 10.
258. Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1962) (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1
(1824)).

259. Fidelity Fed Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de laCuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
260. Sperry, 373 U.S. at 385.
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(4) State laws that function as an "obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives" of a federal regulation
will not be upheld; 26' and
(5) (a) Where a federal statute is silent regarding an activity covered by
a federal agency regulation, the courts will sustain the agency action
if the "agency's interpretation [of the statute] is based on a
permissible construction of the Act;,

262

and

(b) A federal agency acting within the scope of a delegation of
authority from congress can preempt state law.
In applying these preemption principles, the SEC can preempt any
state rule that conflicts with its Rule or any state rule that frustrates the
purpose of its rule. The SEC's authority to do so is not in question and is
not lessened or susceptible to attack because the source of the power it is
displacing is state courts that enact and enforce state ethics rules.
Furthermore, as discussed, the content of the state law, the state's
interest in enacting the law and its underlying policy or objective, is not
factored in to the preemption equation.26 3
The only issue, as far as preemption analysis goes, is the SEC's
construction of Congress' delegation in Section 307 of Sarbanes Oxley
and whether the SEC rule is a permissible construction of that delegation
(proposition 5(a) and (b) above). In related vein, the Washington and
California positions both focus on the Supreme Court's unwillingness to
find federal preemption "unless that was the clear and manifest purpose
of Congress., 2 4
Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act mandates that the SEC
shall issue rules, in the public interest and for the protection of
investors, setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for
attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission in any way
in the representation of issuers, including a rule(1) requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of
securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the
company or any agent thereof, to the chief legal counsel or the chief
executive officer of the company (or the equivalent thereof); and

261. Fidelity,458 U.S. at 147.
262. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 218 (2002).
263. See supra notes 249-252 and accompanying text.
264. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
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(2) if the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to the
evidence (adopting, as necessary, appropriate remedial measures or
sanctions with respect to the violation), requiring the attorney to report
the evidence to the audit committee of the board of directors of the
issuer or to another committee of the board of directors comprised
solely of directors not employed directly or indirectly by the issuer, or
to the board of directors.
The delegation is silent regarding the SEC's authority to
promulgate a rule permitting disclosure to the SEC in certain
circumstances. Consequently, the legislative history relating to Section
307 must be examined.
Given the haste of the Sarbanes Oxley Act's passage, the legislative
history is scant. Nevertheless, there are expressions of legislative history
relevant to the SEC's permissive reporting out rule. Senator Enzi stated
that Section 307 "would not require the attorneys to report violations to
the SEC, only to corporate legal counsel or the CEO, and ultimately, to
the board of directors. 266 Senator Edwards stated that "the only
obligation that this amendment creates is the obligation to report to the
client, which begins with the chief legal officer, and, if that is
unsuccessful, then to the board of the corporation.26 7 There is no
' 268
obligation to report anything outside the client-the corporation.
The SEC's permissive reporting out rule does not contravene the
legislative history. In light of the legislative pronouncements, it is clear
that the senators were concerned with a "requirement" or "obligation" to
report outside the corporate structure to the SEC. Since Section 205.3(d)
states that an issuer "may reveal" and does not require or obligate
disclosure to the SEC, it will be difficult to argue that the SEC's rule
exceeds the scope of the congressional delegation.2 69 Moreover, the
burden is on a state challenging federal preemption to demonstrate that
the SEC's rule is not "based on a permissible construction., 270 Since the
plain language of Rule 205.3(d) conforms to the congressional
delegation's purpose, namely the enactment of rules regulating attorneys
"[for] the public interest and for the protection of investors,, 27' a finding
that the rule is an impermissible construction is highly unlikely. Given
265. Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 7, at 745.
266. 148 CONG. REc. S6524, (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Enzi).
267. Id. (statement of Sen. Edwards) (emphasis added).
268. Id. (emphasis added).
269.
270.
271.

17 C.F.R. § 205.
Barnhart,535 U.S. at 218.
Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 7.
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the application of the preemption principles, a court will likely hold that
SEC's permissive reporting out rule preempts contrary state ethics rules.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This Note has addressed issues relating to the conflict between the
SEC attorney conduct rules and state ethics rules. This Note takes the
position that the SEC's stance on preemption as adopted and
incorporated by the SEC general counsel's letter, will likely preempt
contrary state ethics rules. After applying the preemption principles
articulated by Supreme Court precedent, it becomes apparent that federal
preemption of contrary state ethics rules is likely to occur. While the
Washington and California bar associations have aggressively
articulated their cases against preemption, their positions are contrary to
undisputed principles traditionally and consistently applied by the
Supreme Court in its preemption jurisprudence.
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